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ENDING TAX REVENUE STANDING 
JUSTIN PIDOT
†




States often act to protect those that live within their borders by 
passing laws and regulations, enforcing criminal codes, and providing 
social services. On occasion, they also file suit in federal court to vindi-
cate their residents’ rights.  
Just like private plaintiffs, states must prove standing pursuant to 
case law interpreting Article III of the Constitution.
1
 But states also stand 
apart from traditional plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has instructed that 
states receive “special solicitude,” entitling them to a degree of leeway in 
asserting standing.
2
 Federal courts also allow states to sue as parens 
patriae—meaning that they can sue to protect the welfare of their resi-
dents—even when they are not directly injured.
3
 And courts sometimes 
allow states to sue because of claimed threats to their tax base,
4
 a theory 
this essay terms “tax revenue standing.” 
Having named the theory, this essay argues that tax revenue stand-
ing should be eliminated. Every loss of tax revenue can be described as 
an injury falling within the parens patriae doctrine, and every injury 
falling within the parens patriae doctrine implicates tax revenue. The 
redundancy and inefficiency of two theories with precisely the same ef-
fect justifies abolishing tax revenue standing. But there is more. On oc-
casion, states invoke tax revenue standing to avoid the rule that states 
may not sue the United States as parens patriae.5 Because the equivalen-
cy between the two doctrines remains unacknowledged, those states may 
yet succeed.  
I. PARENS PATRIAE STANDING 
Federal courts traditionally disfavor lawsuits brought by one party 
on behalf of another. These suits are usually dismissed for lack of stand-
ing because the plaintiff is not herself injured.
6
 Federal courts do recog-
nize an exception for states, called the parens patriae doctrine, which 
allows states to litigate in circumstances where private parties cannot.  
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 1. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 520. 
 3. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).   
 4. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
 5. See, e.g., Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 6. See Singleton v. Wuff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976). 
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The parens patriae doctrine has its origins in the English common 
law rule that the crown had particular responsibility for and authority 
over children and the mentally incompetent.
7
 At the turn of the Twentieth 
Century, the United Supreme Court embraced a broader meaning of the 
doctrine, suggesting that a state might seek redress in federal court where 
it “has no pecuniary interest” but “the wrongs complained of are such as 
affect the public at large.”
8
 Since that time, states have sued as parens 
patriae in an array of contexts, including where the state alleges that 




Three cases nicely illustrate parens patriae standing. In Alfred L. 
Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
sued apple growers in Virginia for violating federal employment laws, 
alleging that these violations injured Puerto Rican residents by denying 
them employment.
10
 In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad, Georgia al-
leged that a railroad company violated federal anti-trust laws. The Court 
explained that “[t]he rights which Georgia asserts, parens patriae, are 
those arising from an alleged conspiracy of private persons whose price-
fixing scheme, it is said, has injured the economy of Georgia.”
11
 And in 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, two states (Pennsylvania and Ohio) al-
leged that the law of a second state (West Virginia) violated the dormant 
commerce clause by restricting exports of natural gas.
12
 The Court found 
that the “health, comfort, and welfare [of the plaintiff’s residents] are 
seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the 
interstate stream . . . [and that] the state, as the representative of the pub-
lic, has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected.”
13
  
These cases stand in stark contrast to the treatment afforded private 
parties bringing suit in federal court. The state suffers no direct, concrete 
injury—it possesses no “sovereign interests, proprietary interests, or pri-
vate interests” implicated in the challenged conduct.
14
 Rather, the state 
  
 7. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 
195 (1978). Custer provides a concise and interesting account of the origins of the parens patriae 
doctrine in the seventeenth century common law. At the beginning of that century, common law 
courts viewed the crown’s authority over children and the mentally infirm as arising out of different 
doctrines. But a scrivener’s error in 1610, which substituted the word “enfant” for “ideot” in reciting 
a decision by the King’s Bench, led a judge in 1722 to merge the two doctrines. Id. at 202−03. 
 8. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) (quoting In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 (1895)). 
 9. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 609–10 (1982); Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 
(2d Cir. 1971). See also 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2013). 
 10. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 597−99.  
 11. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (italics added). 
 12. 262 U.S. 553, 581−85 (1923).  
 13. Id. at 592. 
 14. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
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has a different, somewhat amorphous interest in the “well-being—both 
physical and economic—of its residents in general.”
15
  
The parens patriae doctrine possesses, however, an important limi-
tation. States cannot invoke the doctrine to sue the federal government. 
States may, of course, file such suits based on traditional injuries to their 
proprietary interests.
16
 But states have no power to sue the United States 
based on injuries to the state’s residents because “[i]n that field it is the 
United States, and not the State, which represents them as parens 
patriae.”17  
The relationship between parens patriae and more traditional inter-
ests is captured by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Kansas v. United 
States.18 Kansas challenged a federal law restricting air traffic at Dallas’s 
Love Field airport. Before rejecting the claims on the merits, the court 
addressed the question of standing. Kansas could not sue as parens 
patriae because the federal government was the defendant. The state had 
standing nonetheless because its employees sometimes flew to Dallas, 
and flying through Love Field would consume less of these employees’ 
time, and therefore cost Kansas less.
19
 In other words, Kansas could not 
sue to protect the welfare of its residents, but the state sustained an inju-
ry, just as would a private employer, because the federal law increased its 
costs of doing business. 
II. TAX REVENUE STANDING 
States sometimes sue to protect their tax revenue, rather than their 
residents’ general well-being. The allegations in such suits superficially 
mirror those that might be advanced by private parties. Tax revenue re-
sembles income, and courts routinely grant private parties standing to 
protect economic interests. Even so, courts sometimes find that states 
lack standing where only tax revenue is at stake.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Oklahoma is a good 
example of a state successfully establishing tax revenue standing. Wyo-
ming brought a dormant commerce clause challenge to an Oklahoma law 
requiring utilities to burn coal mined within Oklahoma’s borders.
 20
 The 
law would reduce demand for Wyoming coal, and, therefore, reduce the 
amount of severance taxes Wyoming could collect on coal mining. The 
  
 15. Id. at 607.  
 16. Id. at 601–02. 
 17. Id at 610 n.16 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923)). See also 
13B WRIGHT, supra note 9.  
 18. 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 19. Id. at 439. 
 20. 502 U.S. 437, 442–43 (1992). 
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States do not always fare so well. Courts have refused to grant 
standing to states because of lost tax revenue, finding such losses overly 
speculative or too generalized. 
In Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, Pennsylvania sued the Small Business 
Administration for classifying parts of the state as a class B disaster area 
in the wake of Hurricane Agnes.
22
 Pennsylvania alleged the classification 
deprived the state of tax revenue because a class A designation would 
have benefited the state’s economy. The D.C. Circuit rejected that argu-
ment, concluding that the allegations constituted merely a “generalized 
grievance” that could not support standing.
23
  
The Tenth Circuit’s Wyoming v. Department of Interior decision 
represents another line of cases denying standing to states based on alle-
gations of lost tax revenue.
24
 Wyoming challenged a rule restricting the 
number of snowmobiles allowed in Yellowstone and Grand Teton Na-
tional Parks, arguing that those restrictions would reduce sales tax reve-
nue. The court declined to decide whether reduced sales taxes constituted 
an adequate basis for standing in theory. Rather, the court found that 




III. RECONSIDERING TAX REVENUE AND PARENS PATRIAE STANDING  
Despite the theoretical distinctions between tax revenue and parens 
patriae standing, the two are different sides of the same coin. Courts 
have, however, not made that equivalency explicit. Nor have they 
acknowledged that an independent tax revenue standing doctrine threat-
ens to undermine the prohibition on states suing the United States as 
parens patriae. 
To understand the illusory nature of the distinction between tax rev-
enue and parens patriae standing, consider differences between a state 
alleging lost tax revenue and a private party alleging lost income or re-
duced sales. Where tax revenue is concerned, states sit in the unique po-
sition of having unfettered power to fully ameliorate any injury they suf-
fer. The state can, quite simply, raise taxes. Private parties lack this abil-
  
 21. Id. at 447, 461. 
 22. 533 F.2d 668, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
 23. Id. at 672. 
 24. 674 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 25. Id. at 1233–34.  
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Because states can always raise more tax revenue, the state itself 
faces no imminent injury. Instead, the state really seeks to protect its 
residents and businesses from increased taxes or decreased services. In 
other words, the state seeks to protect the “well-being—both physical 
and economic—of its residents in general,”
27
 and that is a quintessential 
assertion of parens patriae standing.  
The equivalency between parens patriae and tax revenue standing 
is borne out by the cases. In both Pennsylvania v. West Virginia and Wy-
oming v. Oklahoma, states alleged legislation designed to restrict trade in 
natural resources violated the dormant commerce clause. Both cases 
could be analyzed as manifestations of tax revenue standing or parens 
patrie standing. Wyoming framed its case as involving lost tax revenue. 
It alleged that the Oklahoma law limited the amount of out-of-state coal 
Oklahoma utilities could purchase, which caused the utilities to purchase 
less coal from Wyoming, which caused Wyoming coal companies to 
mine less coal, which caused Wyoming to receive fewer severance taxes. 
While Pennsylvania framed its case as involving injuries to its residents’ 
welfare, it could have relied on tax revenue standing instead, alleging 
that the West Virginia law reduced the amount of natural gas that West 
Virginia gas companies sold to Pennsylvania, which caused Pennsylva-
nia companies to purchase natural gas from elsewhere at a higher price, 
which caused those companies to engage in less economic activity, 
which caused Pennsylvania to collect less taxes. Wyoming’s lawsuit can 
similarly be recast in terms of parens patrie standing, with the state filing 
suit to protect the general welfare of its residents who would be harmed 
by the economic effects of the Oklahoma law. 
This equivalency is not limited to the natural resources context. In 
Snapp, Puerto Rico fought for out-of-state employment opportunities for 
its residents. The denial of those opportunities likely resulted in fewer 
Puerto Ricans with earnings that could be spent on taxed goods within 
the territory, thereby affecting Puerto Rico’s tax base. In Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad, Georgia alleged that anti-competitive behavior 
directly harmed the state’s economy. Such harm necessarily implicates 
tax revenue generated by economic activity within the state.  
Tax revenue standing, then, may provide a means by which states 
can circumvent the well-established rule that prevents suits against the 
federal government as parens patrie. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in 
Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, “virtually all federal policies” cause “unavoida-
  
 26. At the margins, this distinction may collapse. Businesses facing a sufficiently inelastic 
demand for their goods or services may be able to raise prices to offset losses in revenue. On the 
other hand, tax rates can be raised only so much before business and people move to other states.   
 27. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). 
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ble economic repercussions.”
28
 In other words, whenever a state wants to 
impermissibly sue the United States on behalf of its residents, it can easi-
ly recast its interest as one of tax revenue.  
So, courts do not need two standing doctrines addressing general-
ized injuries to states. Parens patriae alone should govern these suits. 29 
Eliminating tax revenue standing recognizes the appropriate relationship 
between the states and the United States. It would also avoid duplicative 
and unnecessary legal argumentation that consumes the resources of 
courts, the states, and the parties that states sue.  
 
  
 28. 533 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 29. Where the federal government directly regulates states’ taxation power, the state possesses 
a sovereign interest that independently supports standing without the need for a tax-revenue theory. 
